Foster & Partners bridge proposal

Hammersmith Bridge would seem to be a unique and most deserving case for special funding, and it is so frustrating that the critical issue of project financing is not addressed in the government Task Force meetings, despite its obvious importance. However we understand that, separate to the Task Force meetings, LBHF have been exploring initiatives which draw on the private sector, not only in the Foster/Ritblat temporary bridge proposal, but also investigating the viability of private funding, secured on an income stream provided by a toll: this financing method which has been used for a number of other UK bridges, including in London, the Dartford Crossing. LBHF residents would be likely to cross toll-free. We understand LBHF have now submitted a comprehensive financial plan to Grant Shapps based on this funding approach.  Consideration might be given to 1% of the toll to be set aside for social funding in Hammersmith, similar to the arrangement on the London Eye ticket price.

Some valuable comparative information has emerged regarding the financing of other London bridges. For the recent £9.6M repairs to Albert Bridge, RBKC paid £2.6M in line with many other bridge repairs as recent research indicates, while TfL paid £7M. The £9M refurbishment of Chiswick Bridge was paid for by TfL. Since TfL are out of funds, the recent upgrade of Wandsworth Bridge was paid for by Wandsworth Council – but since the bridge is a simple cantilever structure, fabricated in steel in 1940, the overall cost was only around £6M, less than 6% of the bill for the 1887 Hammersmith Bridge.

These comparative repair costs highlight the unique problems with the bridge, an ornate, Grade II* listed structure constructed from cast iron and wood in 1887, two years after the first internal combustion engine came off the Benz production line. Before the traffic closure in April 2019, over 20,000 vehicles and 2,000 single-decker buses were crossing the Bridge daily; until total closure in August 2020 16,000 pedestrians and cyclists were crossing daily. Until 1998 heavy goods vehicles and double-decker buses were using the Bridge.

The Bridge is clearly not fit for this purpose. If the outward appearance of the Bridge is to be retained, then within the decorative outer claddings the structure has to be not repaired, but replaced, to create a Bridge which is able to sustain the demands of 21st century traffic.  We discuss this in more detail in the accompanying article.

Site work and a temporary crossing

Site work: Current activity on site is limited to the stripping back and investigation of the two up-river pedestals, which secure the ends of the suspension cables on the west side. This work is being undertaken by Kier contractors and funded from the £1.8 billion second TfL bail-out received from the government in November.

Foster & Partners / Delancey temporary bridge proposal

Bridge proposal

• Raised temporary deck envisages crossing for vehicles, pedestrians and cyclists on 2 levels.
• The deck would overlay and rest on the footings of the existing bridge.
• River traffic could pass underneath.
• Costs believed lower and timescale significantly faster than previous plans.
• Partial dismantling and offsite refurbishment of the existing structure while temporary structure in place.
• Transport Secretary given outline brief by H&F Council Leader on 25th November.

There’s been generally positive comment in the press and social media, and we were particularly pleased to see our favoured approach of offsite construction/restoration being embraced, which should improve the quality of the end result.

Funding

Since the public Task Force meeting in October, there have been snippets of gossip from behind the scenes, but little significant  progress to report. TfL have been instructed to pay for a temporary ferry river crossing, and to contribute £4M towards the bridge stabilising work, drawing from their recent £1.8B government emergency funding.

Central government has now promised to fund the project, conditional on a substantial contribution from the local authority.  LBHF report that funds are not available to meet this demand.  The Hammersmith Society and others are pressing the government to take the long view, and release the Bridge funds now, and negotiate separately with the local authority,  and this is set out in our letters to the Task Force chairman and the Secretary of State for Transport, as previously published.

Enquiries to LBHF and other parties have revealed some further context to the funding problem.  We understand that Hammersmith became involuntary owners of the Bridge in 1985, when the government abolished the GLC (Greater London Council); there is no record of a condition audit taking place at the time, and no maintenance arrangement accompanying the gift, which was perhaps a mistake.

In normal circumstances structural repairs to the bridges over the Thames have been paid for by TfL, with costs of a fraction of the c. £150M budget for Hammersmith Bridge;  this very substantial cost arises largely from the design of the structure with cast iron, and design restrictions on the repair methods imposed by Historic England Grade ll* listing status. 

 Letter to Grant Shapps MP, Secretary of State for Transport

Letter to Baroness Vere, Chair of Bridge Task Force

Letter to Dana Skelley, Director of Bridge Task Force

We’ve made suggestions borne of our various architectural & engineering experiences, and feedback from members who contributed, balancing aesthetics, cost-effectiveness, speed of the works vs. longevity & value to the public. 

We think the repairs might be done more quickly and cheaply, and the result might last longer and be more useful as a bridge, if the slightly modified approach were taken, as outlined.  As an alternative, we’ve also dared to think the unthinkable given the proposed closure duration and costs, and suggested bridge replacement. An architectural competition could be held to decide how to best reuse what is there, but make it fit for the next century as Bazalegette did to the 1827 original, back in the 1880’s.  As we’ve said, this need not involve a total loss of the iconic appearance; it would be up to innovative designers to come up with the solution – we’ve already seen ideas coming from local architects and engineers.

With huge sums of central Government capital and revenue expenditure being regularly announced, the cost of solving the Hammersmith Bridge problem seems small by comparison, and given the considerable inconvenience already endured both sides of the river by some of the most vulnerable members of society, the project deserves immediate and full financial support.

Our report on the meeting has to tread carefully to resist the winds of political bias which seem to be jeopardising project navigation. The exchange of letters between the chairman of the Task force and LBHF reveals the entrenched and opposing positions of government and local authority concerning the funding of the bridge repair programme. At the meeting the Task Force chairman declared that the government is ‘completely ready to fund the entire project subject to local contribution’ – the proportion of this contribution was not defined – while the LBHF deputy leader reported that substantial local authority contribution has already been paid out for the bridge work to date, and LBHF could not afford any further funding. 

Alongside the funding impasse, the meeting provided an excellent explanation of the bridge problems, the anticipated repair works, the investigations in progress, and proposals for temporary pedestrian crossings.

A summary of the current critical issues:

• Project funding: government funding is confirmed conditional on LBHF contribution; LBHF and TfL have no funds available to contribute. TfL to fund the ferry crossing and contribute £4M towards the stabilisation works as a condition of their £1.7B second government support grant.
• Engineering works: completion of pre-design survey work requires a further 4-month programme to inspect each upstream pedestal (the lower housings at each end of the suspension chain); the contractor is ready to proceed with the work on release of funding. See project funding statement above.
• Project Plan: LBHF report that they have provided the ‘robust project plan’ called for by the chairman. We would expect to see a review of alternative options including the replacement of the bridge with a modern structure, taking into account the cost and programme viability of restoring a bridge built over 130 years ago for a very different traffic type and density. 
• Temporary crossing (stage 1): ferry transport for pedestrians and cyclists has been investigated and can be operational within 66 days of contract commitment and release of funding.  See project funding statement above.
• Temporary crossing (stage 2): pedestrian and cycle use of the bridge can be resumed for a  limited period after installation of temporary stabilising frames over the pedestals.  Obtaining the necessary statutory planning consents and carrying out site construction would require around 7 months; estimated cost is £14M.  See project funding statement above.
• Project programme: overall period for completion of the works as currently foreseen, including measures to meet TfL increased traffic loading requirements, is estimated at approximately 6 years – from release of funding.

Bridge permanent stabilisation – cast iron pedestals – slide from meeting

We’re a little concerned that substantial time and costs are currently being allocated for shoring up the cast iron pedestals that are clearly a long way past their best:  4 months/£2.3M blast cleaning prior to 7 months investigation and temporary stabilisation/£13.9M, followed by 21 months/£32M permanent stabilisation, in addition to a planned temperature control system to lower the risk of further cracking.

Following this, a government White Paper Planning for the Future proposed very significant changes to the planning process for public consultation which closed last week.

Changes to the planning procedure

At present, LBHF planning applications are assessed against the development policies in the LBHF Local Plan, in the London Plan, and in the government NPPF (National Planning Policy Framework). The White Paper proposes a new approach:  a new form of Local Plan, replacing the current format of more abstract policy guidance, by a format with a prescriptive system of development rules and a design code. The Local Plan would also include borough zone plans, which would identify three categories of development:

1. Growth areas where ‘substantial development’ would be suitable (similar, we suggest, to Earls Court, Old Oak Common etc)
2. Renewal areas such as existing built areas where development is encouraged (Hammersmith Town Centre, for example)
3. Protected areas like conservation and heritage areas, green belt and parkland.

Planning zones

In Growth and Renewal areas, proposals which are compliant with the Local Plan in height, use-type etc, and compliant with the government NPPF rules, would be effectively guaranteed an automatic outline planning consent, providing a level of certainty in site purchase values. At the next stage, a full planning application,  with detailed proposals, would be granted consent if the proposals comply with the more detailed rules and design codes of the Local Plan.

Community involvement

Public consultation in the planning process would be limited to the stage when the new Local Plan is put together by the local authority: community involvement would be excluded from full planning application stage, because (it is argued)  the application would be assessed against rules which have already been agreed through public consultation.

The intention is to establish a clear set of planning rules, which are in line with government policy, and have been agreed through community consultation; armed with these certainties applications would avoid the ambiguities of policy interpretation and community objection which (it is said) can delay the full planning application stage.

Design codes

CreateStreets – Bonnington Square

To illustrate examples of acceptable design and styling, and to provide a basis of resolution of design disagreements, Design Codes would form part of the Local Plan, and would be reviewed through public consultation when the new Local Plan is being put together. Design codes would be coordinated with the government’s National Design Guide, itself heavily influenced by the CreateStreets campaign and to the emerging National Model Design Code. To help the process, a chief officer for design and place-making would be appointed within each local authority.

Hammersmith Bridge closed: Motor traffic:10th April 2019; Completely:13th August 2020

After much media/social media coverage, including stories on London TV news, a task force was set up on 9 September, chaired by Baroness Vere (roads minister), which includes representatives of the local councils, TfL and Network Rail (for their experience of cast iron bridges), the Port of London Authority and GLA. The task force’s project director is Dana Skelley, a chartered civil engineer, formerly director of roads for London and responsible for the London-wide roads modernisation ahead of the London Olympics and the repairs to Hammersmith Flyover.

Completing the full repair of the Bridge is currently predicted to cost £141-£163m, with stabilisation just to allow safe pedestrian and river traffic at £46m, considerably more than first envisaged.  We covered the announcement of a temporary pedestrian/cycle bridge in April, which is believed to have been costed at less than £10m.  Before lockdown, planning was to be sought for this during the summer with construction starting this autumn, but this has not happened.  We followed up in June with our ideas about widening the pathways while work progresses elsewhere, making the bridge suitable for safe bidirectional cycling and walking; these are also clearly ideas yet to be considered given the new circumstances of complete closure.

Neither the Council nor TfL can finance costs at this level, so government support is essential. The possibility of tolls to finance the work has not been ruled out, indeed some are campaigning for this to make more funds available to speed up the work.

To help members better gauge the local situation, we’ve used this data to create an interactive chart, both here, and pinned to the head of the website for the time being, automatically updated every day in the early evening.  Due to the well-known delays in test results, be aware that latest numbers are always revised upwards for severa days after initial publication, so we now filter the newest unrepresentative figures – check here regularly for updates.

The interactive map shown adjacent provides infection data in the last week by “MSOA” (Middle Super Output Area), representing c.7200 people, an area which approximates a council ward. H&F has the distinction of having the physically smallest MSOA in the country – E02000378 – Shepherds Bush South.  Click on the map to see more information about each area.

H&F council COVID-19 advice is here.

H&F HealthWatch

We’ve been contacted by our member Jane Wilmot, also a member of the local H&F HealthWatch committee who want to find out how H&F residents have used GP practices during lockdown and in particular uncover any experiences of health inequality. HealthWatch is a statutory committee of the independent regulator, the Care Quality Commission (CQC).

If you would like to help, please:

• Complete the survey by 12th October: Survey Monkey link
• Share the survey among all your contacts including any contacts on Twitter
• Alert anyone you know who does not have a smart phone or internet access to let them know they can contact HealthWatch for a hard copy, ask for help in completing the survey etc.

If you would like any assistance in completing the survey or would like it in another format, please contact H&F HealthWatch at or call 0203 886 0386. Healthwatch Hammersmith & Fulham address: 141-143 King Street, W6 9JG.

The disappearing Crossrail opening date

Construction projects still typically employ analogue leaders in a digital age

Mega transport projects are almost always fraught with delays and cost overruns because of the often inappropriate governance and leadership.  Inappropriate leadership – really ? Surely they’re run by Captains of Industry with huge experience and many letters after their names ?  But the leadership is most often bound up with the management of high budget, and perceived high risk items, such as tunnelling with Tunnel Boring Machines (TBM) – the so called “bricks and sticks” – often 80%+ of the initial budget.

Another day at the TBM office (here for the SuperSewer)

Appointments like these often address last century’s problems, a bit like taking over a British Leyland production line, only to discover that it’s now staffed by strike-free German-made robots, seemingly little delayed by the pandemic, at least here in Hammersmith. These elements are significantly lower risk than they once were, because of such mechanisation and associated technologies, engineered processes, resulting in tighter controls and more repeatability “at the coalface”, even though still beloved of TV documentaries with some false jeopardy added to spice them up.  Still, documentaries do serve a valuable purpose in illustrating the point – the operator at the controls of the TBM deep underground is using a computer keyboard, mouse, several screens, a desk phone, with not a shovel in sight.

To re-purpose a phrase from the last decade, these projects still typically employ analogue leaders in a digital age.  It’s commonly assumed that the “backroom boys” will sort of the hidden techie stuff – keep out of the detail.  WRONG!  This is where the risks are nowadays, in signalling and other heavily software-based systems, sometimes poorly designed code, frequent legacy issues, often clunky low-performance or de-facto interfaces (sometimes as simple as on/off dry contacts, AKA electromechanical relays, or their software equivalent “control points”), logical “gotchas” and subsequent system integration problems.

The issue is peculiarly amplified in railways, where proven operational safety is expected, yet a lot of what could provide that – 100% reuse of existing proven designs, robot style, ironically more akin to a modern tunnelling process – allowing the project to focus solely on what must be changed, is in this environment, swamped by commercial, time, perceived risk, or political pressures to use this supplier or that solution. This results in yet another bespoke railway with the inelegant compromises that Heath Robinson would recognise.  Amplifying the misconception that the project is some sort of smooth production-line shown in the plans, the term “production design” is regularly misused, whereas the earlier compromises mean the endeavour has unwittingly become a “prototype design” – the approach to building a unique prototype like Crossrail or HS2 vs. a production design for 1000, or 100,000 units a year are rather different – your scribe has done all three.

Future leaders should present their software engineering credentials at the door